Mechanism, truth, and Penrose's new argument

DOI10.1023/A:1022863925321MaRDI QIDQ1871136zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Stewart Shapiro

Publication date 6 May 2003

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022863925321

zbMATH Keywords

computer mechanismGödelian consequencesincompleteness of \(A^2\)intensional mathematicsLucasPenrosetruth theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Review text

The author investigates and criticizes in great detail Penrose's later (1994) argument against computer mechanism [see Sections 3.16 and 3.23 of \textit{R. Penrose}'s book, Shadows of the mind. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press (1995; Zbl 0847.00001)]. Recall that anti-mechanist approaches to modeling the human mind began with J. R. Lucas in 1961. They were significantly extended by Penrose in 1989. Both approaches hinge on the belief that the incompleteness of arithmetic provides all the logical, philosophical, and rational resources necessary to refute any claim made by a computer mechanist. In the present paper, the author vigorously defends the view that Penrose's new argument seems to invoke an unrestricted truth predicate and an unrestricted knowability predicate. However, then the premises are inconsistent. Further, he challenges anti-mechanists to provide a sound argument that does not use unrestricted truth and knowability predicates.

Recommendations

• Remarks on Penrose's ``new argument
• On Gödel's theorem and mechanism: inconsistency or unsoundness is unavoidable in any attempt to `out-Gödel' the mechanist
• KI 2005: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
• Mechanical intelligence and Godelian Arguments
• Normativity and mechanism

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• Incompleteness, Mechanism, and Optimism
• Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski's schema (T)
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• Penrose's new argument
• Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals^†
• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
• Ultramaximalist minimalism!
• Which number theoretic problems can be solved in recursive progressions on Π₁¹-paths through O?

Cited in

(9)

• The modal argument for hypercomputing minds
• A metasemantic challenge for mathematical determinacy
• A new Gödelian argument for hypercomputing minds based on the busy beaver problem
• Remarks on Penrose's ``new argument
• A refutation of Penrose's Gödelian case against artificial intelligence
• Normativity and mechanism
• The Four Sons of Penrose
• KI 2005: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
• Analysis of Penrose's second argument formalised in DTK system

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