Mechanisms with costly knowledge

DOI10.1145/2840728.2840742MaRDI QIDQ2800548zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Atalay M. Ileri, Silvio Micali

Publication date 15 April 2016

Published in Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/2840728.2840742

zbMATH Keywords

auction theorycostly knowledgeextensive form gamesgame theoryknowledge refinementmechanism designmodelsecond price auctionset-theoretic uncertaintysocial welfare analysisuncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(1)

• The cost of knowledge

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