Merger, partial collusion and relocation

DOI10.1007/S00712-004-0091-9MaRDI QIDQ1766949zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pedro Posada, Odd Rune Straume

Publication date 3 March 2005

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://ekstern.filer.uib.no/svf/2002/23-02.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mergerrelocationspatial competitionpartial collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• A note on mergers and relocation
• Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties
• Partial cooperation in location choice: Salop's model with three firms
• The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition
• Profitable collusion on costs: a spatial model

Cited in

(6)

• A note on mergers and relocation
• Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects
• Mergers and innovation sharing
• Mixed oligopolies and collusion
• Merger selection, evidence provision, and the timing of merger control
• Restructuring and merger waves

This page was built for publication: Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1766949)