Modeling adversaries in a logic for security protocol analysis

DOI10.2168/LMCS-8(1:21)2012MaRDI QIDQ2881088zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Joseph Y. Halpern, Riccardo Pucella

Publication date 3 April 2012

Published in Logical Methods in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2168/lmcs-8(1:21)2012

zbMATH Keywords

algorithmic knowledgeattacker modelsDolev-Yao modelepistemic logicprotocol analysissecurity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(10)

• An omniscience-free temporal logic of knowledge for verifying authentication protocols
• Interaction and causality in digital signature exchange protocols
• Models for an adversary-centric protocol logic
• Logics of rational interaction
• A substructural epistemic resource logic
• Programming Languages and Systems
• A computational interpretation of Dolev-Yao adversaries
• Adversarial logic
• To know or not to know: Epistemic approaches to security protocol verification
• An algorithmic impossible-worlds model of belief and knowledge

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Casper

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