Monetary Union and the Assignment Problem

DOI10.2307/3440525MaRDI QIDQ4211606zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James Meade, Martin R. Weale

Publication date 29 November 1998

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/3440525

zbMATH Keywords

European monetary unionseparation of monetary and fiscal management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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Cited in

(9)

• The European Monetary System: Crisis and future
• Central bank independence and public debt policy
• Bargaining a monetary union
• Should I stay or should I go? An agent-based setup for a trading and monetary union
• Introducing instruments of central bank accountability in a monetary union
• Reserve requirements, currency substitution, and seigniorage in the transition to European monetary union
• Monetary union viability: a criterion proposal
• Designing fiscal institutions in a monetary union
• When a montary union fails: A parable

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