Multiple priors and comparative ignorance

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105132MaRDI QIDQ1995291zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Igor Kopylov

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105132

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguity aversioncomparative ignorancedecision avoidanceintransitivitypartition dependencepreference reversals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox
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Cites work

• "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance
• An axiomatic characterization of preferences under uncertainty: Weakening the independence axiom
• An axiomatic foundation for regret theory
• Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox
• Framing contingencies
• Justifiable preferences
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Non-transitive measurable utility for decision under uncertainty
• Rational choice with status quo bias
• Regret theory: a new foundation
• Small worlds: Modeling attitudes toward sources of uncertainty

Cited in

(6)

• Unawareness, priors and posteriors
• The multiple priors of the open-minded decision maker
• Ambiguity and awareness: a coherent multiple priors model
• Partition priming in judgments of imprecise probabilities
• Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox
• Mixture-betweenness: uncertainty and commitment

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