Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities
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Recommendations
- Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
- Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
Cites work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Constrained school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Efficient assignment respecting priorities
- Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Implementation in generalized matching problems
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
Cited in
(10)- Legal Assignments and Fast EADAM with Consent via Classic Theory of Stable Matchings
- Nash implementation of matching rules
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings
- Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
- Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
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