Network Cournot competition
From MaRDI portal
Abstract: Cournot competition is a fundamental economic model that represents firms competing in a single market of a homogeneous good. Each firm tries to maximize its utility---a function of the production cost as well as market price of the product---by deciding on the amount of production. In today's dynamic and diverse economy, many firms often compete in more than one market simultaneously, i.e., each market might be shared among a subset of these firms. In this situation, a bipartite graph models the access restriction where firms are on one side, markets are on the other side, and edges demonstrate whether a firm has access to a market or not. We call this game emph{Network Cournot Competition} (NCC). In this paper, we propose algorithms for finding pure Nash equilibria of NCC games in different situations. First, we carefully design a potential function for NCC, when the price functions for markets are linear functions of the production in that market. However, for nonlinear price functions, this approach is not feasible. We model the problem as a nonlinear complementarity problem in this case, and design a polynomial-time algorithm that finds an equilibrium of the game for strongly convex cost functions and strongly monotone revenue functions. We also explore the class of price functions that ensures strong monotonicity of the revenue function, and show it consists of a broad class of functions. Moreover, we discuss the uniqueness of equilibria in both of these cases which means our algorithms find the unique equilibria of the games. Last but not least, when the cost of production in one market is independent from the cost of production in other markets for all firms, the problem can be separated into several independent classical emph{Cournot Oligopoly} problems. We give the first combinatorial algorithm for this widely studied problem.
Recommendations
Cited in
(27)- Computing pure Nash equilibria in network revenue management games
- An imperfect competition on scale-free networks
- Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
- Cournot competition, imitation, and information networks
- Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
- Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games
- Equilibrium and inefficiency in multi-product Cournot games
- On a generalized Cournot oligopolistic competition game
- Interacting oligopolistic and oligopsonistic Cournot markets
- Network formation in competition model
- Multiplicity of equilibria in conjectural variations models of natural gas markets
- Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare?
- Network oligopolies with multiple markets
- Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs
- Networks of complements
- Online assortment and market segmentation under Bertrand competition with set-dependent revenues
- Transparency and control in platforms for networked markets
- Spatial price integration in commodity markets with capacitated transportation networks
- On the Role of a Market Maker in Networked Cournot Competition
- Selling complementary goods: dynamics, efficiency and revenue
- An improved Cournot competition model: consideration of market share objective
- Bertrand Competition in Networks
- Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition)
- Technical note -- Multimarket Cournot equilibria with heterogeneous resource-constrained firms
- Potentials in quadratic Cournot cross-holding games
- A hypergraph evolutionary game theoretic Cournot model for networked markets
- Optimal search segmentation mechanisms for online platform markets
This page was built for publication: Network Cournot competition
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2936973)
