Obviously strategyproof single-minded combinatorial auctions

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2020.71MaRDI QIDQ6842501zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre

Publication date 18 March 2026

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPICS.ICALP.2020.71

zbMATH Keywords

extensive-form mechanismsgreedy algorithmsosp mechanismssingle-minded combinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of software (68Nxx) Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405687 (Why is no real title available?)
• Obvious strategyproofness, bounded rationality and approximation. The case of machine scheduling
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
• Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(2)

• Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms without money for scheduling
• An algorithmic theory of simplicity in mechanism design

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