On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted

DOI10.1007/S001820200094MaRDI QIDQ1414422zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Antoni Calvó-Armengol

Publication date 23 November 2003

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200094

zbMATH Keywords

communication networktime preferencesbargaining partnerNoncooperative bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited in

(1)

• The role of communication content and reputation in the choice of transaction partners. A study based on field and laboratory data

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