On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0230-1MaRDI QIDQ532516zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Parimal Kanti Bag, Santanu Roy

Publication date 5 May 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0230-1

zbMATH Keywords

fundraisingincomplete informationpublic goodssequential vs. simultaneous contributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Public goods (91B18) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Optimal sequential allocation with imperfect feedback information
• Sequential location equilibria under incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2143394
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1361071
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054711
• Information revelation in sequential auctions with uncertainties about future objects
• Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information

Cites work

• A Sequential Solution to the Public Goods Problem
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
• Public subscription and private contributions

Cited in

(15)

• Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
• On efforts in teams with stereotypes
• Public subscription and private contributions
• Incomplete information and incentives to free ride
• Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?
• Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
• Solution for a class of closed-loop leader-follower games with convexity conditions on the payoffs
• Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?
• Complementarity and information in collective action
• A note on contribution games with loss functions
• Inverse Stackelberg public goods game with multiple hierarchies under global and local information structures
• Weakest-link public goods: Giving in-kind or transferring money in a sequential game
• Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
• Asymmetric reimbursement and contingent fees in environmental conflicts: observable vs. unobservable contracts
• On increased risk and the voluntary provision of public goods

This page was built for publication: On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q532516)