Optimal enfranchisement

DOI10.1007/S00355-025-01607-9MaRDI QIDQ7233057zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marc Fleurbaey, Ulysse Lojkine

Publication date 24 April 2026

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-025-01607-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
• On the Distribution of the Number of Successes in Independent Trials
• Stay away from fair coins: a Condorcet jury theorem
• Storable votes
• Trading votes for votes. A dynamic theory
• Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective

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