Optimal on-line allocation rules with verification

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_1MaRDI QIDQ2292610zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Markos Epitropou, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date 4 February 2020

Full work available at URL https://rd.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-030-30473-7_1.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

prophet inequalitiesstopping problemsverification

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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(5)

• A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
• Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
• Optimal multi-unit allocation with costly verification
• Bayesian persuasion: reduced form approach
• Information design in allocation with costly verification

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