Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0477-2MaRDI QIDQ622586zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ian Ayres, Colin Rowat, Nasser Zakariya

Publication date 3 February 2011

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0477-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
• Optimal voting rules

Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Competitive equilibria in semi-algebraic economies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226094 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
• Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
• Option pricing: A simplified approach
• Semidefinite programming relaxations for semialgebraic problems

Cited in

(5)

• Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
• Minority voting and long-term decisions
• Search by committee

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