Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation Revisited: How Country Size Matters

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.T01-1-00028MaRDI QIDQ4787892zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Constantinos Syropoulos

Publication date 8 January 2003

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00028

zbMATH Keywords

country sizetariff retaliationtrade modelNash tariff equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Cited in

(10)

• Nash equilibrium in tariffs in a multi-country trade model
• Coalition-enhancing fiscal policies in an open economy: a CES framework of Gale's transfer paradox
• The structure of Nash equilibrium tariffs
• Free trade: What are the terms-of-trade effects?
• BUYING LOCALLY
• TARIFF RETALIATION AND THE FREE TRADE ARGUMENT
• Does a larger country set a higher optimal tariff with monopolistic competition and capital accumulation?
• Uniqueness and comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in a tariff retaliation model
• Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models
• The structure of optimal tariff rates in a large country with market power

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