Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
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Recommendations
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- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures
Cites work
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930664 (Why is no real title available?)
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Cited in
(21)- Robust incentive compatibility of voting rules with positively correlated beliefs
- Ordinally Bayesian incentive compatible probabilistic voting rules
- Decentralized matching at senior-level: stability and incentives
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- Incentive compatibility and feasibility constraints in housing markets
- Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
- Random matching in the college admissions problem
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Unanimity and local incentive compatibility in sparsely connected domains
- The structure of (local) ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible random rules
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Some further results on random OBIC rules
- Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
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