Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for d-approval elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-03780-6_23MaRDI QIDQ2867125zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jianxin Wang, Jiong Guo, Qilong Feng, Jianer Chen, Min Yang

Publication date 10 December 2013

Published in Combinatorial Optimization and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-03780-6_23

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• An efficient parameterized algorithm for m-set packing
• Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
• Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• How hard is bribery in elections?
• How hard is it to control an election?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2234775 (Why is no real title available?)
• Integer Programming with a Fixed Number of Variables
• Kernelization: new upper and lower bound techniques
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• Studies in Computational Aspects of Voting
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

Cited in

(6)

• Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
• The control complexity of \(r\)-Approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
• Schulze and ranked-pairs voting are fixed-parameter tractable to bribe, manipulate, and control
• Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
• Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
• Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems

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