Parameterized complexity of control by voter selection in Maximin, Copeland, Borda, Bucklin, and Approval election systems
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Cites work
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- How hard is bribery in elections?
- How hard is it to control an election?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1095171 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1161563 (Why is no real title available?)
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Multimode control attacks on elections
- On complexity of lobbying in multiple referenda
- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Cited in
(15)- Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
- A parameterized perspective on protecting elections
- Resolute control: forbidding candidates from winning an election is hard
- Control complexity in Borda elections: solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: a theoretical analysis
- Control complexity in Bucklin and fallback voting: an experimental analysis
- Parameterized complexity of voter control in multi-peaked elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Parameterized complexity of control and bribery for \(d\)-approval elections
- Elections with few voters: candidate control can be easy
- The Last Voting Rule Is Home: Complexity of Control by Partition of Candidates or Voters in Maximin Elections
- Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
- Exact algorithms for weighted and unweighted Borda manipulation problems
- Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
- On the parameterized complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
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