Passive cryptanalysis of the unconditionally secure authentication protocol for RFID systems

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_6MaRDI QIDQ3094986zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh

Publication date 27 October 2011

Published in Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1008.5296

zbMATH Keywords

authentication protocolpassive attackRFID

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Abstract: Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first UnConditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for low-cost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCS-RFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags. Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enable a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing to more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol.

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Cited in

(9)

• On the security of RFID anti-counting security protocol (ACSP)
• Cryptanalysis of the Cho et al. protocol: a hash-based RFID tag mutual authentication protocol
• RFID authentication efficient proactive information security within computational security
• An automatic, time-based, secure pairing protocol for passive RFID
• Quasi-linear cryptanalysis of a secure RFID ultralightweight authentication protocol
• Noisy Cryptographic Protocols for Low-Cost RFID Tags
• ACSP: A novel security protocol against counting attack for UHF RFID systems
• Passive Attacks on a Class of Authentication Protocols for RFID
• Cryptanalysis of EC-RAC, a RFID Identification Protocol

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