Power Allocation and Spectrum Sharing in Multi-User, Multi-Channel Systems With Strategic Users
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Abstract: We consider the decentralized power allocation and spectrum sharing problem in multi-user, multi-channel systems with strategic users. We present a mechanism/game form that has the following desirable features. (1) It is individually rational. (2) It is budget balanced at every Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the game form as well as off equilibrium. (3) The allocation corresponding to every Nash equilibrium (NE) of the game induced by the mechanism is a Lindahl allocation, that is a weakly Pareto optimal allocation. Our proposed game form/mechanism achieves all the above desirable properties without any assumption about, concavity, differentiability, monotonicity, or quasi-linearity of the users' utility functions.
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