Power indices for multicandidate voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01769257MaRDI QIDQ1087481zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Edward M. Bolger

Publication date 1986

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769257

zbMATH Keywords

multi-candidate voting gamespower indexsimple gamesupporting coalition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• A Characterization of an Extension of the Banzhaf Value to Multicandidate Voting Games
• A power index in a simple game with multialternatives
• Indices of Criticality in Simple Games
• Indices of criticality in simple games
• A note on positions and power of players in multicameral voting games

Cites work

• N‐person games in partition function form
• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• Values of games in partition function form

Cited in

(35)

• Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
• Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power
• A set of axioms for a value for partition function games
• Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games
• A value for games with \(n\) players and \(r\) alternatives
• Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games.
• Voting power in an ideological spectrum. The Markov-Pólya index
• Voting power when using preference ballots
• Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies
• Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
• The Banzhaf value in the presence of externalities
• On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index
• A model of influence with a continuum of actions
• Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention
• The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
• Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
• The Shapley-Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games
• The Banzhaf Index for Multicandidate Presidential Elections
• A value based on marginal contributions for multi-alternative games with restricted coalitions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5773528 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Class of Efficient Values for Games in Partition Function Form
• The banzhaf – coleman index for games withralternatives
• A power index in a simple game with multialternatives
• Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters
• Limit property of a multi-choice value and the fuzzy value
• A note on positions and power of players in multicameral voting games
• Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
• Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure
• A Characterization of an Extension of the Banzhaf Value to Multicandidate Voting Games
• A generalized Deegan-Packel index for multialternative voting games in case of nonhomogeneous voters
• Political power on a line graph
• Power in plurality voting games
• Freedom and voting power
• A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
• Banzhaf measures for games with several levels of approval in the input and output

This page was built for publication: Power indices for multicandidate voting games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1087481)