Practical invalid curve attacks on TLS-ECDH

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21MaRDI QIDQ5097055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tibor Jager, Jörg Schwenk, Juraj Somorovsky

Publication date 19 August 2022

Published in Computer Security -- ESORICS 2015 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 Generic

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_21

zbMATH Keywords

cyclic groupselliptic curve cryptography

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Cryptography (94A60)

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Cited in

(7)

• Authenticated confidential channel establishment and the security of TLS-DHE
• Invalid curve attacks in a GLS setting
• A privacy-preserving RFID authentication protocol based on El-Gamal cryptosystem for secure TMIS
• Practical realisation and elimination of an ECC-related software bug attack
• Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys
• A Secure and Efficient Implementation of the Quotient Digital Signature Algorithm (qDSA)
• SM2-VBKE: achieving cryptographic binding between verification integrity and key generation

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