Preselection and expert advice

DOI10.1007/S00182-016-0551-9MaRDI QIDQ1677246zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Elisabeth Schulte, Mike Felgenhauer

Publication date 10 November 2017

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/21174

zbMATH Keywords

cheap talkreputationsafe haven

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Publication:4734607
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079520
• Optimal advice
• Prediction with expert evaluators' advice
• Expert advice to a voting body
• How to use expert advice
• Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
• Professional advice
• Resolution of selection principles for expert evaluations
• Expert advising under checks and balances

Cites work

• A Theory of Credibility
• Herding over the career
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Professional advice
• Sequential Equilibria
• Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility

Cited in

(1)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079520 (Why is no real title available?)

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