Principal-agent models

DOI10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_416MaRDI QIDQ5149738zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Inés Macho-Stadler, David Pérez-Castrillo

Publication date 15 February 2021

Published in Complex Social and Behavioral Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-0716-0368-0_416

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionasymmetric informationcontractsincentivesmoral hazard

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Recommendations

• Analysis of various optimal contracts in the problem of stimulation of agents by a principal in a model with two agents
• Principal and expert agent
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• Contracts and productive information gathering
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

Cites work

• A note on the optimal structure of production
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A theory of sequential reciprocity
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Codes of best practice in competitive markets for managers
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Common Agency
• Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Equity and adverse selection with correlated costs
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207455 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44398 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841893 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Incentives in Teams
• Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• Monopoly and product quality
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries
• Using and abusing economic theory

Cited in

(7)

• Principal-agent VCG contracts
• Optimal contracting model in a social environment and trust-related psychological costs
• A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production
• Study on the model of high-tech enterprise governance structure
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47464 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agency Models With Frequent Actions
• An analytically solvable principal-agent model

This page was built for publication: Principal-agent models

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5149738)