Proactive Incentive Regulation in Multi-Agent Systems with Environmental Feedback

DOI10.48550/arXiv.2609.24506MaRDI QIDQ7353496zbMATH OpenarXivFDO

Authors Xinyang Cao, Shijia Hua, Linjie Liu

Publication date 21 September 2026

Published in arXiv

Tldr This paper develops a multi-agent framework to study how proactive punitive incentives affect cooperation and sustainability in environmental feedback systems with coupled resource states. We find that timely punishment during abundance can stabilize cooperation, whereas delayed penalties in scarcity can lead to complex dynamics hindering cooperation.

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2609.24506

arXiv classification

math-phmath.DS

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