Proactive secret sharing with constant communication
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Cites work
- A forward-secure public-key encryption scheme
- A simplified approach to threshold and proactive RSA
- Communication-efficient proactive secret sharing for dynamic groups with dishonest majorities
- Communication-optimal proactive secret sharing for dynamic groups
- Efficient robust secret sharing from expander graphs
- How to share a secret
- How to withstand mobile virus attacks (extended abstract)
- How to withstand mobile virus attacks, revisited
- Interlacing eigenvalues and graphs
- Interlacing families. I: Bipartite Ramanujan graphs of all degrees
- Interlacing families. IV: Bipartite Ramanujan graphs of all sizes
- Maintaining authenticated communication in the presence of break-ins
- Maintaining security in the presence of transient faults
- On the second eigenvalue of a graph
- Proactive secret sharing or: How to cope with perpetual leakage
- Pseudorandom functions and permutations provably secure against related-key attacks
- Related-key security for pseudorandom functions beyond the linear barrier
- Simplified VSS and fast-track multiparty computations with applications to threshold cryptography
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