Probabilistic unawareness
Summary: The modeling of awareness and unawareness is a significant topic in the doxastic logic literature, where it is usually tackled in terms of full belief operators. The present paper aims at a treatment in terms of partial belief operators. It draws upon the modal probabilistic logic that was introduced by \textit{R. J. Aumann} [``Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge, Int. J. Game Theory 28, No. 3, 263--300 (1999; \url{doi:10.1007/s001820050111})] at the semantic level, and then axiomatized by \textit{A. Heifetz} and \textit{P. Mongin} [Games Econ. Behav. 35, No. 1--2, 31--53 (2001; Zbl 0978.03017)]. The paper embodies in this framework those properties of unawareness that have been highlighted in the seminal paper by \textit{S. Modica} and \textit{A. Rustichini} [``Unawareness and partitional information structures, ibid. 27, No. 2, 265--298 (1999; \url{doi:10.1006/game.1998.0666})]. Their paper deals with full belief, but we argue that the properties in question also apply to partial belief. Our main result is a (soundness and) completeness theorem that reunites the two strands -- modal and probabilistic -- of doxastic logic.
- A general possible worlds framework for reasoning about knowledge and belief
- A logic for reasoning about probabilities
- Alternative semantics for unawareness
- Awareness dynamics
- Belief and probability
- Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
- Dynamic epistemic logic for implicit and explicit beliefs
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players
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- Impossible possible worlds vindicated
- Information structures with unawareness
- Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
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- Intuitive Probability on Finite Sets
- Logic and probabilistic update
- Modal logic
- Note on unawareness: negative introspection versus \(AU\) introspection (and \(KU\) introspection)
- Probability logic for type spaces
- Qualitative probability as an intensional logic
- Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness
- The dynamics of awareness
- Two models of unawareness: comparing the object-based and the subjective-state-space approaches
- Unawareness and partitional information structures
- Unawareness of theorems
- Unawareness, beliefs, and speculative trade
- Unawareness, priors and posteriors
- Epistemic game theory and logic: introduction
- Dynamic awareness and zero probability beliefs
- Speculation under unawareness
- Knowledge, awareness and probabilistic beliefs
- Reprint of: Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness revisited
- Unawareness with ``possible possible worlds
- Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior
- Game awareness: a questionnaire
- Interactive unawareness
- Pragmatic reasoning about unawareness
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