Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.06.001MaRDI QIDQ1669100zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ville Korpela

Publication date 30 August 2018

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.06.001

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryNash equilibriumcharacterizationimplementationex ante fairnessex post fairness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1015852 (Why is no real title available?)
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation
• Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
• Divide-and-permute
• Fair (and not so fair) division
• Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
• Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• Implementability and Horizontal Equity Imply No-Envy
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Supermodular mechanism design
• Symmetric mechanism design
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Toward Natural Implementation

Cited in

(4)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4037221 (Why is no real title available?)
• Symmetric mechanism design: comment
• A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
• A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation

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