Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers

DOI10.1007/978-3-540-71070-7_9MaRDI QIDQ3541693zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steve Kremer, Antoine Mercier, Ralf Treinen

Publication date 27 November 2008

Published in Automated Reasoning (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71070-7_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Network protocols (68M12) Formal languages and automata (68Q45) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Recommendations

• Automated unbounded verification of security protocols
• Verification of security protocols with lists: from length one to unbounded length
• Verifying security protocols modelled by networks of automata
• Automatic verification of security protocols in the symbolic model: the verifier ProVerif
• From secrecy to authenticity in security protocols

Cites work

• Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003
• Attacking group protocols by refuting incorrect inductive conjectures
• CONCUR 2005 – Concurrency Theory
• On the Automatic Analysis of Recursive Security Protocols with XOR
• On the security of public key protocols
• Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers
• Round-optimal contributory conference key agreement
• Termination of rewriting
• Tree Automata with Memory, Visibility and Structural Constraints
• Visibly Tree Automata with Memory and Constraints

Cited in

(4)

• Interactively secure groups from obfuscation
• Verification of security protocols with lists: from length one to unbounded length
• Proving Group Protocols Secure Against Eavesdroppers
• Attacking group protocols by refuting incorrect inductive conjectures

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