Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
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Publication:1001138
DOI10.1007/s12046-008-0009-2zbMath1167.91354OpenAlexW2147746955MaRDI QIDQ1001138
Sujit Gujar, Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari
Publication date: 12 February 2009
Published in: Sādhanā (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12046-008-0009-2
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Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities, Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. I. Key concepts and classical results, Mechanisms with learning for stochastic multi-armed bandit problems, AN OVERVIEW ON GAME THEORY APPLICATIONS TO ENGINEERING
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