The strategy structure of some coalition formation games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.001zbMath1165.91316MaRDI QIDQ1002323

Gabrielle Demange

Publication date: 25 February 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.001

zbMATH Keywords

manipulability; assignment; substitutes; incremental value; coalition formation; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism; two-sided market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B68: Matching models

Related Items

Strategy-proof coalition formation, Constrained coalition formation on valuation structures: formal framework, applications, and islands of tractability, Complements and substitutes in generalized multisided assignment economies, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER MANAGEMENT: CAN ISSUE LINKAGE HELP MITIGATE EXTERNALITIES?

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