The strategy structure of some coalition formation games
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Publication:1002323
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.001zbMath1165.91316MaRDI QIDQ1002323
Publication date: 25 February 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.001
manipulability; assignment; substitutes; incremental value; coalition formation; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism; two-sided market
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