Debreu's social equilibrium theorem with asymmetric information and a continuum of agents
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Publication:1003116
DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3zbMath1155.91421OpenAlexW2142796970MaRDI QIDQ1003116
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0246-3
Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Economics of information (91B44)
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- A Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem*
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