Updating our beliefs about inconsistency: The Monty-Hall case
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Publication:1005764
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.08.006zbMATH Open1155.91327OpenAlexW1963650183MaRDI QIDQ1005764FDOQ1005764
Publication date: 10 March 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.08.006
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Cited In (2)
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