On the support size of stable strategies in random games

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.056zbMath1157.91311MaRDI QIDQ1006075

Spyros C. Kontogiannis, Paul G. Spirakis

Publication date: 17 March 2009

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.056

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary games; bimatrix games; evolutionary stable strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

On random quadratic forms: supports of potential local maxima, On Random Symmetric Bimatrix Games, The Complexity of Simple Models—A Study of Worst and Typical Hard Cases for the Standard Quadratic Optimization Problem, On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player multi-strategy evolutionary game, Analysis of the expected density of internal equilibria in random evolutionary multi-player multi-strategy games, Building a completely positive factorization, On sparsity of the solution to a random quadratic optimization problem

Cites Work

• Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games
• Nash equilibria of Cauchy-random zero-sum and coordination matrix games
• Non-cooperative games
• How large is the support of an ESS?
• Game theory and evolution
• Evolutionary game dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item