Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.015zbMath1162.91358OpenAlexW2151491611MaRDI QIDQ1007769

Ángel Hernando-Veciana

Publication date: 24 March 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5173

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationauctionsopen information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Information acquisition in conflicts, The insider's curse, Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance, Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions

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