Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
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Publication:1007769
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.10.015zbMATH Open1162.91358OpenAlexW2151491611MaRDI QIDQ1007769FDOQ1007769
Authors: Ángel Hernando-Veciana
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5173
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Comparing location experiments
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Descriptive statistics for non-parametric models. III: Dispersion
- Log-concave probability and its applications
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- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
- Successful uninformed bidding
- The effect of entry and information costs on oral versus sealed-bid auctions
Cited In (10)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- The insider's curse
- Information acquisition during a descending auction
- Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
- Information acquisition in conflicts
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
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