On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.006zbMath1159.91373MaRDI QIDQ1017798

Paulo Barelli

Publication date: 12 May 2009

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.006

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design; common knowledge; full surplus extraction; universal beliefs space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design, The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited, Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types, Full surplus extraction from samples, Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction, Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces, The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces, Beliefs, payoffs, information: on the robustness of the BDP property in models with endogenous beliefs

Cites Work

• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Continuity in auction design
• Attractors of iterated function systems and Markov operators
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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