Incremental approaches to establishing trust
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Publication:1020592
DOI10.1007/S10683-007-9173-1zbMath1161.91372OpenAlexW2042817860MaRDI QIDQ1020592
Robert Kurzban, Mary L. Rigdon, Bart J. Wilson
Publication date: 29 May 2009
Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9173-1
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (2)
IRREVERSIBILITY AND MONITORING IN DYNAMIC GAMES: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ⋮ Building trust -- one gift at a time
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