Cryptanalysis of the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol for Thompson's group
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Publication:1021237
DOI10.1007/S00145-007-9016-4zbMATH Open1161.94418arXivmath/0607184OpenAlexW2028757458WikidataQ57460940 ScholiaQ57460940MaRDI QIDQ1021237FDOQ1021237
Publication date: 8 June 2009
Published in: Journal of Cryptology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper shows that an eavesdropper can always recover efficiently the private key of one of the two parts of the public key cryptography protocol introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in [9]. Thus an eavesdropper can always recover the shared secret key, making the protocol insecure.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/0607184
Cites Work
- Introductory notes on Richard Thompson's groups
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- An algebraic method for public-key cryptography
- Thompson’s Group and Public Key Cryptography
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Length-based cryptanalysis: the case of Thompson's group
- The group of parenthesized braids.
- The simultaneous conjugacy problem in groups of piecewise linear functions.
- Cryptanalysis of Group-Based Key Agreement Protocols Using Subgroup Distance Functions
Cited In (2)
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