Cryptanalysis of the Shpilrain-Ushakov protocol for Thompson's group
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Abstract: This paper shows that an eavesdropper can always recover efficiently the private key of one of the two parts of the public key cryptography protocol introduced by Shpilrain and Ushakov in [9]. Thus an eavesdropper can always recover the shared secret key, making the protocol insecure.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1759777 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2209676 (Why is no real title available?)
- An algebraic method for public-key cryptography
- Cryptanalysis of Group-Based Key Agreement Protocols Using Subgroup Distance Functions
- Introductory notes on Richard Thompson's groups
- Length-based cryptanalysis: the case of Thompson's group
- The group of parenthesized braids.
- The simultaneous conjugacy problem in groups of piecewise linear functions.
- Thompson’s Group and Public Key Cryptography
Cited in
(4)- Length-based cryptanalysis: the case of Thompson's group
- CRYPTANALYSIS OF USHAKOV — SHPILRAIN’S AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL BASED ON THE TWISTED CONJUGACY PROBLEM
- Cryptanalysis of Group-Based Key Agreement Protocols Using Subgroup Distance Functions
- Rotation Numbers of Elements in Thompson's Group ${\bf T}$
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