Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments -- an experimental study

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.014zbMath1161.91340OpenAlexW2073569927MaRDI QIDQ1021612

Christina Strassmair, Matthias Sutter

Publication date: 8 June 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.02.014

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcommunicationtournamentcollusionfree-ridingteam decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (8)

Interdependent preference models as a theory of intentions ⋮ The give and take game: analysis of a resource sharing game ⋮ Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games ⋮ Vote and voice: an experiment on the effects of inclusive governance rules ⋮ Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude ⋮ ``Success breeds success or ``Pride goes before a fall? Teams and individuals in multi-contest tournaments ⋮ Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination ⋮ Pre-contest communication incentives

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• A model of pre-game communication
• A survey of experiments on communication via cheap talk
• Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals

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