Potential, value, and coalition formation

DOI10.1007/S11750-007-0035-YzbMATH Open1163.91312OpenAlexW2048708133MaRDI QIDQ1024697FDOQ1024697

Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano

Publication date: 17 June 2009

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0035-y

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zbMATH Keywords

potentialcoalitional gamesvalueprobabilistic models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Bargaining Problem
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• On weighted Shapley values
• Multilinear extensions and the banzhaf value
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
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• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Potentials in cooperative TU-games
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• The Shapley Value as a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility
• Weighted weak semivalues
• Utility functions for simple games
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
• Power indices and the veil of ignorance

Cited In (6)

• The prediction value
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
• A cooperative value in a multiplicative model
• Potential, Value, and Consistency

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