Potential, value, and coalition formation
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Publication:1024697
DOI10.1007/s11750-007-0035-yzbMath1163.91312OpenAlexW2048708133MaRDI QIDQ1024697
Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano
Publication date: 17 June 2009
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-007-0035-y
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