Optimizing the marriage market: an application of the linear assignment model

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2009.06.009zbMATH Open1175.90260OpenAlexW2001926071MaRDI QIDQ1039809

Marlène Sapin, Jacques-Antoine Gauthier, Eric D. Widmer, Emmanuel Fragnière, Vi Cao Nguyen

Publication date: 23 November 2009

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2009.06.009

zbMATH Keywords

OR in societal problem analysismarriage marketdivorcecouples matchinglinear assignment model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Assignment Problems
• Matching theory
• Combinatorial optimization. Polyhedra and efficiency (3 volumes)
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (8)

• Co-ranking mates: assortative matching in marriage markets
• College admissions with ties and common quotas: integer programming approach
• The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation, and Testing
• A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
• Mechanisms for the Marriage and the Assignment Game
• Online voluntary mentoring: optimising the assignment of students and mentors
• First-order under-approximations of consistent query answers
• Aspects of arranged marriages and the theory of Markov decision processes

Uses Software

• GAMS

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