Managerial overload and organization design

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.05.014MaRDI QIDQ1046249zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yossi Spiegel

Publication date 21 December 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.014

zbMATH Keywords

divisional structurefunctional structuremanagerial overloadmoral hazardmoral hazard in teamsproject selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form

Cited in

(4)

• Task assignment and organizational form
• Sequential analysis of organization design: A model and a case of Japanese firms
• Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy
• Matching Organizational Structure with Firm Attributes: A Study of Master Limited Partnerships

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