From social welfare ordering to acyclic aggregation of preferences

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2MaRDI QIDQ1065691zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hervé Moulin

Publication date 1985

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(85)90002-2

zbMATH Keywords

acyclic and anonymous aggregation methodsArrow's impossibility theoremoligarchyquasi-transitive

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
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Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3361657 (Why is no real title available?)
• Social choice and individual values
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(16)

• F-decomposable social aggregation rules and acyclic choice
• Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
• Transitivity revisited
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets
• On ordered weighted averaging social optima
• A new approach for identifying the Kemeny median ranking
• Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules
• Limits of acyclic voting
• Acyclic Choice without the Pareto Principle
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
• A weak utility function for acyclic preferences
• The structure of social decision functions
• Oligarchies in spatial environments
• Binary effectivity rules
• A conflict analysis approach for illuminating distributional issues in sustainability policy

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