Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90067-7MaRDI QIDQ1067957zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akira Okada

Publication date 1983

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90067-7

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationequilibrium pointexchanges of informationgame- theoretical frameworkmarket structuremarket under uncertaintynoncooperative gameoligopolistic firms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Review text

This paper investigates the coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for exchanges of information about their cost functions in a game- theoretical framework. An oligopolistic market under uncertainty is considered in which each firm knows its own cost function but not those of all the others. The following results are shown. It is profitable for each firm to exchange the information about cost functions with other firms. When the uncertainty levels of the cost functions of all firms are symmetric, it is of common interest for them to exchange their information by forming the grand coalition. On the other hand, when their uncertainty levels are highly asymmetric, firms possessing less uncertain cost functions come into conflict with one another when exchanging information exclusively with the most uncertain firms. As a result, more than one coalition may be formed among firms.

Recommendations

• Coalition-proof information exchanges
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4051294
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2129483
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly

Cites work

• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach

Cited in

(6)

• Oligopoly, information and welfare
• Coalition structure values in differential information economies: Is unity a strength?
• Coalition-proof information exchanges
• Information sharing in oligopoly: sharing groups and core-periphery architectures
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4051294 (Why is no real title available?)
• Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies

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