The proportional solution for rights problems
The paper ranks among the attempts to build up a sociologically acceptable axiomatic theory of optimal allocation of amounts (like net worth, estates, taxes etc.) according to the claims of several subjects. The author mentions a lot of possible axioms, part of them new. He studies logical relations of these axioms and tries to characterize solutions satisfying several combinations of them. To do this, he defines the solutions in the form of vector functions and shows that in many cases such a function satisfies a given set of axioms iff it belongs to a specified class of functions that may be expressed explicitely. This enables one to prove that the proportional solution is the only optimal in many situations.
- The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims.
- Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems
- Extended proportionality in division problems with multiple references
- A note on Gale's example
- A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud
- Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism in Quasi-Linear Bargaining
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3654685 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3617833 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- A noncooperative justification for egalitarian surplus sharing
- Bargaining problems with claims
- Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution
- On fair compensation
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
- Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems.
- Fair division with uncertain needs
- The procedural egalitarian solution
- Proportional rules for state contingent claims
- Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
- The three musketeers: four classical solutions to bankruptcy problems.
- The proportional rule for problems with constraints and claims.
- On probabilistic rationing methods.
- Group order preservation and the proportional rule for the adjudication of conflicting claims
- Sustainability in bankruptcy problems.
- An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' rule
- Inequality preserving rationing
- Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
- Priority and proportionality in bankruptcy
- Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
- On reward sharing in blockchain mining pools
- A bankruptcy approach to solve the fixed cost allocation problem in transport systems
- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- Liberal political equality does \textit{not} imply proportional representation
- Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems
- Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
- Proportionality, equality, and duality in bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility
- Families of sequential priority rules and random arrival rules with withdrawal limits
- A characterization of the proportional rule in multi-issue allocation situations
- Stability and fairness in the job scheduling problem
- The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures
- Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update
- From bargaining solutions to claims rules: a proportional approach
- Composition properties in the river claims problem
- Characterization of the Reverse Talmud bankruptcy rule by exemption and exclusion properties
- Endowment additivity and the weighted proportional rules for adjudicating conflicting claims
- Introduction to the special issue in honor of William Thomson
- Duality in land rental problems
- The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
- On the investment implications of bankruptcy laws
- Characterization of the core in full domain marriage problems
- On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems
- Additive rules in discrete allocation problems
- On surplus-sharing in partnerships
- Non-manipulability by clones in bankruptcy problems
- Additive adjudication of conflicting claims
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION"
- FISHERY MANAGEMENT GAMES: HOW TO ADMIT NEW MEMBERS AND REDUCE HARVESTING LEVELS
- On Dividing an Amount According to Individual Claims or Liabilities
- Mixed rules in multi-issue allocation situations
- HOW TO COPE WITH DIVISION PROBLEMS UNDER INTERVAL UNCERTAINTY OF CLAIMS?
- A noncooperative approach to bankruptcy problems with an endogenous estate
- A note on passepartout problems
- Characterization of linear symmetric solutions for allocation problems
- Revenue sharing in airline alliance networks
- BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
- PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
- Optimal strategy and cost sharing of free gift cards in a retailer power supply chain
- Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split
- Design of water quality policies based on proportionality in multi-issue problems with crossed claims
- Proportional clearing mechanisms in financial systems: an axiomatic approach
- The equal share proportional solution in a permit sharing problem
- Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games
- Non-proportional inequality preservation in gains and losses
- Random conjugates of bankruptcy rules
- Reflecting inequality of claims in gains and losses
- Partial-implementation invariance and claims problems
- Claim-strength problems and mixtures: an axiomatic study
- Merging-splitting-proofness in financial systems: a characterization result
- Rationalizing sharing rules
- Weighted proportionality with exclusions in bilateral claims problems
- Claims manipulations discriminate between egalitarian rules
- Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations
- For claims problems, compromising between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules
- For claims problems, another compromise between the proportional and constrained equal awards rules
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