To gather information from n informed agents, a principal can rely on a mediator. Does there exist a direct communication scheme yielding the same equilibrium payoffs? Yes, as soon as extraneous signals (`sunspots') can be observed before the beginning of the game.
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(13)- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium
- Mediated talk
- The value of mediated communication
- Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
- Sunspots, correlation and competition
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- Belief-invariant and quantum equilibria in games of incomplete information
- A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games
- How to talk to multiple audiences
- Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests
- Intentional vagueness
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