The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(89)90128-2zbMath0673.90016OpenAlexW2123085942MaRDI QIDQ1121150

Thomas A. Gresik, Mark Allen Satterthwaite

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90128-2

zbMATH Keywords

Private informationtrading mechanismsex post efficient allocationsindependent, private-values market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (34)

Optimal market thickness ⋮ Optimal mechanism for land acquisition ⋮ Robust trading mechanisms ⋮ Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition ⋮ Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Reorganizing a partnership efficiently ⋮ Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions ⋮ Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games ⋮ Asymptotically optimal prior-free asset market mechanisms ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Efficient allocation with continuous quantities ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ An ascending double auction ⋮ The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information ⋮ Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality ⋮ Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade ⋮ The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ⋮ Optimal trading mechanisms with ex ante unidentified traders ⋮ Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply ⋮ The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms ⋮ Optimality versus practicality in market design: a comparison of two double auctions ⋮ Efficient trading with nonlinear utility ⋮ A general non-central hypergeometric distribution ⋮ Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations ⋮ Price discovery using a double auction ⋮ To sell public or private goods ⋮ The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs ⋮ Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade ⋮ Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.

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