Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory

DOI10.1007/BF01268155zbMath0677.90092MaRDI QIDQ1123823

Andrew McLennan

Publication date: 1989

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

fixed pointssequential equilibriumbest response correspondenceconsistent conditional systems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (15)

Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Conditional systems revisited ⋮ Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof ⋮ Characterization of consistent assessments in extensive form games ⋮ Fixed points of contractible valued correspondences ⋮ A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria ⋮ Approximation of contractible valued correspondences by functions ⋮ An elementary proof that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of consistent assessments ⋮ Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms in continuum economies. Characterization and existence ⋮ Weighted values and the core ⋮ The space of conditional systems is a ball ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Small perturbations and stochastic games ⋮ Independence for full conditional probabilities: structure, factorization, non-uniqueness, and Bayesian networks ⋮ Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Fixed points of contractible valued correspondences
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The space of conditional systems is a ball
• Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium
• Multistage Games with Communication
• A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Fixed Point Theorems for Multi-Valued Transformations
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

This page was built for publication: Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory