Taxing price makers

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90103-5zbMath0461.90012OpenAlexW2076411284MaRDI QIDQ1152842

Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Jacques Laffont

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90103-5

zbMATH Keywords

optimality conditionsKuhn-Tucker necessary conditionsoptimal government policymaximization of social welfaresingle commodityfirst-best Pareto optimal programindirect tax vectorlump-sum transfer vectorsecond-best Pareto optimalitysingle monopolist

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (6)

On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange ⋮ Multi‐tier pricing in uniform and non‐uniform tax/subsidy systems ⋮ Coalition-enhancing fiscal policies in an open economy: a CES framework of Gale's transfer paradox ⋮ Inducing efficiency in oligopolistic markets with increasing returns to scale ⋮ When is multidimensional screening a convex program? ⋮ John A. Weymark

Cites Work

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• Production of the public sector and taxation in a simple second best model
• General equilibrium with price-making firms
• Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints a l'equilibre budgetaire
• Private Constant Returns and Public Shadow Prices
• On the Foundations of the Theory of Monopolistic Competition
• Existence d'un Equilibre General de Concurrence Imparfaite: Une Introduction
• Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour
• Optimal Pricing for a Public Enterprise

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