Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
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Publication:1162428
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(82)90009-XzbMath0481.90004MaRDI QIDQ1162428
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
committee; implementation theory; blocking power of coalitions; cooperative stability; cooperative voting; core of simple game; cores of effectivity functions; strong equilibrium concept
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